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ToPIcAL SuRvEY
LAW OF THE SEA - SHIPPING - STATE REGULATION
OF BAYS - RHODE ISLAND'S STATUTE REGULATING
PILOTAGE OF BLOCK ISLAND SOUND IS WITHIN
46 U.S.C. § 211 (1970).
Warner v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1976)
The state of Rhode Island passed a statute' requiring foreign
and American vessels engaged in international trade to utilize
ships' pilots licensed by the state Pilotage Commission when
traversing Block Island Sound. Plaintiffs, Connecticut-licensed
ships' pilots, who passed through the Sound when guiding ships
into Connecticut ports, challenged the state law as beyond the
scope of 46 U.S.C. § 211 (1970). This statute authorizes the
states to regulate the use of pilots "in the bays, inlets, rivers,
harbors, and ports of the United States ....
The plaintiffs contended that Block Island Sound was not
a "bay" within the meaning of the federal statute. As the statute
failed to define the term "bay," the parties relied on the definition
set forth in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 3 an international treaty ratified by the United
States' Senate in 1961. This definition of the word "bay" had
been accepted by the United States Supreme Court in United
4
States v. California.
The treaty stated that a bay "is a well-marked indentation
whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth
as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere
curvature of the coast."5 The treaty applied a "semi-circle test"
for determining the sufficiency of the water area enclosed. Under
this test in order for a body of water to qualify as a bay, it must
have at least as much surface area within its natural boundaries
and a closing line drawn across its mouth as within a semi-circle
having a diameter equal to the length of the closing line.6 The
treaty also stated that if a coastline indentation had more than
one mouth due to the presence of islands, "the semi-circle test
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 46-9.1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 211 (1970).
3. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958
[1961] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
4. 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
5. Convention, supra n.3, art. 7, § 3.
6. Id.
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shall be drawn on a line as long as the 7sum total of the lengths
of the lines across the different mouths."
The Rhode Island statute did not define the western boundary of Block Island Sound. Consequently, whether or not that
body of water was a !'bay" or part of a "bay" under the semicircle test was dependent upon where the court established the
western boundary. The plaintiffs suggested two different boundaries which the Rhode Island legislature might have intended to
describe the western limits of Block Island Sound. When the
area within each western boundary and the eastern and southern
boundaries established by the Rhode Island statute was calculated, neither configuration showed Block Island Sound to be a
"bay" under the semi-circle test.
The district court had found that it was consonant with the
terms of the treaty to treat Block Island Sound as part of a
larger body of inland water which included Long Island Sound.
The court established the western boundary for this body of
water at the East River, between Manhattan and Long Island.
Applying the semi-circle test to the area enclosed by this boundary and the boundaries established by the state statute, the court
found that the Long Island - Block Island Sound combination
constituted a "bay" within the meaning of the treaty. It therefore held that Block Island Sound, as part of the larger body of
water, was a "bay," and that Rhode Island was authorized by
46 U.S.C. § 211 (1970) to regulate ships' pilots in these waters.
Alternatively, the district court found that Block Island Sound
was a "historic bay" which was subject to state regulation without
applying the treaty's tests.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
upheld the district court's application of the semi-circle test to
the Long Island Sound - Block Island Sound combination. The
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Block Island Sound was
not a well-defined indentation and not a "bay." The court cited
Supreme Court dicta in United States v. Maine,8 describing Long
Island Sound as inland water, rather than open sea. The court
declined to rule on the historic bay question.
The court of appeals further found that it was not necessary
for ships to enter or leave Rhode Island ports in order for the
state to regulate their pilots; mere passage through Rhode Island
7. Id.
8. 420 U.S. 515, 517 n.1 (1975).
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waters was sufficient. The court noted that the state had an
interest in promoting navigational safety and protecting the environmental quality of its coastline. These objectives could be
achieved by regulating pilotage of vessels through its waters.
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that under the
Submerged Lands Act of 19539 Rhode Island's jurisdiction did
not extend beyond the waters within three miles of its coastline.
The court pointed out that a state could regulate pilotage and
other activities in areas beyond the three mile limit since the
extent of state regulations and state territorial boundaries were
separate issues.
Robert B. Goss

9. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).

